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Phase transitions are abrupt changes in the macroscopic properties of a sys-
tem. Examples of the phenomenon are familiar: freezing, condensation, magne-
tization. Often these transitions are particularly dramatic, as when solid objects
composed of the silvery metal gallium vanish into puddles when picked up (the
temperature of the hand is just enough to raise gallium’s temperature past its
melting point). Characterized generally, one finds them inside and outside of
physics, in systems as diverse as neutron stars, DNA helices, financial mar-
kets, and traffic. In the past half-century, the study of phase transitions and
critical phenomena has been a central preoccupation of the statistical physics
community. In fact, it is now a truly interdisciplinary area of research. Phase
transitions manifest at many different scales and in all sorts of systems, so they
are of interest to atomic physicists, materials engineers, astronomers, biologists,
sociologists and economists. However, philosophical attention to the founda-
tional issues involved has thus far been limited.
This is unfortunate, because the theory of phase transitions is unusual in
many ways and offers a novel perspective that could enrich a number of debates
in the philosophy of science. In particular, questions about reduction, emer-
gence, explanation and approximation all arise in a particularly stark manner
when considering this phenomenon. Here we’ll focus on these questions as they
relate to the most studied type of phase transition, namely, transitions between
different equilibrium phases in thermodynamics. These are sudden changes be-
tween one stable thermodynamic state of matter and another while one smoothly
varies a parameter. A paradigmatic example is the change in water from liquid
to gas as the temperature is raised or the pressure is reduced.
In the small philosophical commentary on this topic, such changes have pro-
voked many surprising claims. Many have claimed that phase transitions cannot
be reduced to statistical mechanics, that they are truly emergent phenomena.
The argument for this conclusion hangs on one’s understanding of the infinite
idealization invoked in the statistical mechanical treatment of phase transitions.
In this chapter we’ll focus on puzzles associated with this idealization. Is infi-
nite idealization necessary for the explanation of phase transitions? If so, does
it show that phase transitions are, in some sense, emergent phenomena? If so,
what precisely is that sense? Questions of this sort provide a concrete basis for
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the exploration of philosophical approaches to reduction and idealization, and
they also bear on the ongoing scientific study of these systems.
1 The Physics of Phase Transitions
Phase transitions raise interesting questions about inter-theoretic relationships
because they are studied from three distinct theoretical perspectives. Ther-
modynamics provides a macroscopic, phenomenological characterization of the
phenomenon. Statistical mechanics attempts to ground the thermodynamic
treatment by explaining how this macroscopic behavior arises out of the inter-
action of microscopic degrees of freedom. This project has led to the employ-
ment of renormalization group theory, a tool first developed in the context of
particle physics for studying the behavior of systems under transformations of
scale. While renormalization group theory is usually placed under the broad
rubric of statistical mechanics, the methods employed are importantly different
from the traditional tools of statistical mechanics. Rather than a probability
distribution over an ensemble of configurations of a single system, the primary
theoretical device of renormalization group theory is the flow generated by the
scaling transformation on a space of Hamiltonians representing distinct physi-
cal systems. In this section we describe how these three approaches treat the
phenomenon of phase transitions, with special attention to the employment of
the infinite particle idealization.
1.1 Thermodynamic Treatment
The thermodynamic treatment of phases and phase transitions began in the
nineteenth century. Experiments by Andrews, Clausius, Clapeyron, and many
others provided data that would lead to developed theories of phase transitions
and critical phenomena. Gradually it was recognized that at certain values of
temperature and pressure a substance can exist in more than one thermody-
namic phase (e.g., solid, liquid), while at other values there can be a change in
phase but no co-existence of phases.
For instance, as pressure is reduced or temperature is raised, liquid water
transitions to its gaseous phase. At the boundary between these phases, both
liquid and gaseous states can coexist; the thermodynamic parameters of the sys-
tem do not pick out a unique equilibrium phase. In fact, at the triple point of
water (temperature 273.16 K and pressure 611.73 Pa), all three phases – solid,
liquid and gas – can coexist. The transitions at these phase boundaries are
marked by a discontinuity in the density of water. As the pressure is reduced
at a fixed temperature, the equilibrium state of water switches abruptly from a
high-density liquid phase to a low-density gaseous phase. This is an example of
a first order phase transition. As the temperature is increased past the critical
temperature of 647 K, water enters a new phase. In this regime, there are no
longer macroscopically distinct liquid and gas phases, but a homogenous super-
critical fluid that exhibits properties associated with both liquids and gasses.
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Changing the pressure leads to a continuous change in the density of the fluid;
there are no phase boundaries. This supercritical phase allows a transition from
liquid to gas that does not involve any discontinuity in thermodynamic observ-
ables: raise the temperature of the liquid past the critical temperature, reduce
the pressure below the critical pressure (22 MPa for water), then cool the fluid
back to below the critical temperature. This path takes the system from liquid
to gas without crossing a phase boundary. The transition of a system past its
critical point to the supercritical phase is a continuous phase transition.
Mathematically, phase transitions are represented by non-analyticities or
singularities in a thermodynamic potential. A singularity is a point at which
the potential is not infinitely differentiable, so at a phase transition some deriva-
tive of the thermodynamic potential changes discontinuously. A classification
scheme due to Ehrenfest provides the resources to distinguish between first and
second order transitions in this formalism. A first order phase transition in-
volves a discontinuity in the first derivative of a thermodynamic potential. In
the liquid-gas first order transition, the volume of the system, a first derivative
of the thermodynamic potential known as the Gibbs free energy, changes dis-
continuously. For a second order phase transition the first derivatives of the
potentials are continuous but there is a discontinuity in a second derivative of a
thermodynamic potential. At the liquid-gas critical point we see a discontinu-
ity in the compressibility of the fluid, which is a first derivative of volume and
hence a second derivative of the Gibbs free energy. Ehrenfest’s scheme extends
naturally to allow for higher order phase transitions as well. An n-th order
transition would be one whose n-th derivative is discontinuous. Contemporary
statistical mechanics retains the category of first order phase transitions (some-
times referred to as abrupt transitions), but all other types of non-analyticities
in thermodynamic potentials are grouped together as continuous phase transi-
tions.
Continuous phase transitions are often referred to as order-disorder transi-
tions. There is usually some symmetry in the supercritical phase that is broken
when we cross below the critical point. This broken symmetry allows for the
material to be ordered in various ways, corresponding to different phases. A
stark example of the transition between order and disorder is the transition in
magnetic materials, such as iron, between paramagnetism and ferromagnetism.
At room temperature, a piece of iron is permanently magnetized when exposed
to an external magnetic field. In the presence of a field, the minimum energy
configuration is the one with the largest possible net magnetic moment rein-
forcing the field, so the individual dipoles within the iron align to maximize the
net moment. This configuration remains stable even when the external field
is removed. Materials with this propensity for induced permanent magnetiza-
tion are called ferromagnetic. If the temperature is raised above 1043 K, the
ferromagnetic properties of iron vanish. The iron is now paramagnetic; it can
no longer sustain induced magnetization when the external field is removed.
In the stable configuration, there is no correlation between the alignments of
neighboring dipoles. In the paramagnetic phase, no direction is picked out as
special after the magnetic field is switched off. The material exhibits spatial
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symmetry. In the ferromagnetic phase, this symmetry is broken. The dipoles
line up in a particular spatial direction even after the field is removed. The order
represented by this alignment does not survive the transition past criticality.
A simple way to understand this transition between order and disorder is in
terms of the minimization of the Helmholtz free energy of the system:
F = E − TS (1)
Here E is the energy of the system, T is the temperature, and S is the entropy.
The stable configuration minimizes free energy. At low temperatures, the en-
ergy term dominates, and the low energy configuration with dipoles aligned is
favored. At high temperatures, the entropy term dominates, and we get the
high entropy configuration with uncorrelated dipole moments. The change in
magnetic behavior is explicable as a shift in the balance of power in the battle
between the ordering tendency due to minimization of energy and the disorder-
ing tendency due to maximization of entropy. As indicated, the paramagnetic-
ferromagnetic transition is continuous, not first order. All first derivatives of
the free energy are continuous, but second derivatives (such as the magnetic
susceptibility χ = ∂
2F
∂H2 , where H is the magnetization) are not.
The transition from order to disorder is also represented, following Landau,
as the vanishing of an order parameter. In the case under consideration, this
parameter is the net magnetization M of the system . Below the critical point,
you have different phases with distinct values of the order parameter. If we
simplify our model of the magnetic material so that the induced magnetization
of the dipoles is only along one spatial axis (as in the Ising model), then at
each temperature below criticality the order parameter can take two values,
related by a change of sign. The magnetization vanishes as we approach the
critical point and remains zero in the supercritical phase, corresponding to a
disappearance of distinct phases.
The vanishing of the order parameter close to the critical temperature Tc is
characterized by a power law:
M ∝ (−t)β (2)
where t is the reduced temperature (T − Tc)/Tc. The exponent β characterizes
the rate at which the magnetization falls off as the critical temperature is ap-
proached. It is an example of a critical exponent, one of many that appear in
power laws close to the critical point. The experimental and theoretical study
of critical exponents has been crucial to recent developments in the theory of
phase transitions.
1.2 Statistical Mechanical Treatment
Statistical mechanics is the theory that applies probability theory to the mi-
croscopic degrees of freedom of a system in order to explain its macroscopic
behavior. The tools of statistical mechanics have been extremely successful in
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explaining a number of thermodynamic phenomena, but it turned out to be par-
ticularly difficult to apply the theory to the study of phase transitions. There
were two significant obstacles to the development of a successful statistical me-
chanical treatment of phase transitions: one experimental and one conceptual.
The experimental obstacle had to do with the failure of mean field theory.
This was the dominant approach to the statistical mechanics of phase transitions
up to the middle of the twentieth century. The theory is best explicated by
considering the Ising model, which represents a system as a lattice of sites, each
of which can be in two different states. The states will be referred to as spin up
and spin down, in analogy with magnetic systems. However, Ising models have
been successfully applied to a number of different systems, including the liquid-
gas system near its critical point. The Hamiltonian for the Ising model involves
a contribution by an external term, corresponding to the external magnetic
field for magnetic systems, and internal coupling terms. The only coupling
is between neighboring spins on the lattice. It is energetically favorable for
neighboring spins to align with one another and with the external field. This
model is supposed to represent the way in which local interactions can produce
the kinds of long range correlations that characterize a thermodynamic phase.
In statistical mechanics, all thermodynamic functions are determined by
the canonical partition function. The coupling terms in the Hamiltonian make
the calculation of the partition function for the Ising model mathematically
difficult. To make this calculation tractable, we approximate the contribution
of a particular lattice site to the energy of the system by supposing that all
its neighbors have a spin equal to the ensemble average. This approximation
ignores fluctuations of spins from their mean values. The fluctuations become
less relevant as the number of neighbors of a particular lattice site increases, so
the mean field approximation works better the higher the dimensionality of the
system under consideration. Once the partition function is calculated using this
approximation, there is an elegant method due to Landau for determining the
critical exponents. Unfortunately, Landau’s method gives results that conflict
with experiment. For instance, the mean field value for the critical exponent β is
0.5, but observation suggests the actual value is about 0.32. The approximation
fails close to the critical point of a magnetic system. In fact, this failure is
predicted by Landau theory itself. The theory tells us that as we approach the
critical point, the correlation length diverges. This is the typical distance over
which fluctuations in the microscopic degrees of freedom are correlated. As this
length scale increases, fluctuations become more relevant, and the mean field
approximation, which ignores fluctuations, weakens. Mean field theory cannot
fully describe continuous phase transitions because of this failure near criticality.
Another approach is needed for a full statistical mechanical treatment of the
phenomenon.
As mentioned, there was also a deeper conceptual obstacle to a statistical
mechanics of phase transitions. If one adopts the definition of phase transitions
employed by thermodynamics, then phase transitions in statistical mechanics
don’t seem possible. The impossibility claim can be explained very easily. As
mentioned above, thermodynamic functions are determined by the partition
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function. For instance, the Helmholtz free energy is given by:
F = −kT lnZ (3)
where k is Boltzmann’s constant, T is the temperature of the system, and Z is










with En labeling the different possible mechanical energies of the system. Recall
the definition of a phase transition according to thermodynamics:
(Def 1) An equilibrium phase transition is a nonanalyticity in the free energy.
Depending on the context, one might choose a nonanalticity in a different ther-
modynamic potential; however, that freedom won’t affect matters here.
As natural as it is, (Def 1) makes a phase transition seem unattainable
in statistical mechanics. The reason is that each of the exponential functions
in (4) is analytic, the partition function is just a sum of exponentials, and
the free energy essentially is just the logarithm of this sum. Since a sum of
analytic functions is itself analytic and the logarithm of an analytic function
itself analytic, the Helmholtz free energy, expressed in terms of the logarithm
of the partition function, will also be analytic. Hence, there will be no phase
transitions as defined by (Def 1). Since the same reasoning can be applied to any
thermodynamic function that is an analytic function of the canonical partition
function modifications of (Def 1) to other thermodynamic functions won’t work
either. (For a rigorous proof of the above claims, see Griffiths (1972).)
In the standard lore of the field, this problem was resolved when Onsager
in 1944 demonstrated for the first time the existence of a phase transition
from nothing but the partition function. He did this rigorously for the two-
dimensional Ising model with no external magnetic field. How did Onsager
manage the impossible? He worked in the thermodynamic limit of the system.
This is a limit where the number of particles in the system N and the volume
of the system V go to infinity while the density ρ = N/V is held fixed. Letting
N go to infinity is the crucial trick in getting around the “impossibility” claim.
The claim depends on the sum of exponentials in (4) being finite. Any finite
sum of analytic functions will be analytic. Once this restriction is removed,
however, it is possible to find nonanalyticities in the free energy. The apparent
lesson is that statistical mechanics can describe phase transitions, but only in
infinite particle systems.
It is common to visualize what’s going on in terms of the Yang-Lee theorem.
The free energy is a logarithm of the partition function, so it will exhibit a
singularity where the partition function goes to zero. But the partition function
is a polynomial of finite degree with all positive coefficients, so it has no real
positive roots. Instead the roots are imaginary and the zeroes of the partition
function must be plotted on the complex plane. The Yang-Lee theorem, for a
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two-dimensional Ising model, says that these zeroes sit on the unit sphere in the
complex plane. As the number of particles increases, the zeroes become denser
on the unit sphere until at the thermodynamic limit they intersect the positive
real axis. Since a real zero of the partition function is only possible in this limit,
it is only in this limit that we can have a phase transition (understood as in Def
1).
An alternative definition of phase transitions is sometimes used, one pro-
posed by Lebowitz (Lebowitz, 1999). A phase transition occurs, on this defini-
tion, just in case the Gibbs measure (a generalization of the canonical ensemble)
is nonunique for the system. This corresponds to a coexistence of distinct phases
and therefore a phase transition. Using this alternative definition, however,
won’t change philosophical matters. The Gibbs measure can only be nonunique
in the thermodynamic limit, just as (Def 1) can only be satisfied in the ther-
modynamic limit. That said, this way of looking at the issue perhaps makes
it easier to see the similarities between the foundational issues raised by phase
transitions and those raised by spontaneous symmetry breaking.
1.3 Renormalization Group Theory
We mentioned in the previous section that mean field theory fails near the crit-
ical point for certain systems because it neglects the importance of fluctuations
in this regime. Dealing with this strongly correlated regime required the intro-
duction of a new method of analysis, imported from particle physics. This is
the renormalization group method. While mean field theory hews to tools and
forms of explanation that are orthodox in statistical mechanics, such as deter-
mining aggregate behavior by taking ensemble averages, renormalization group
theory introduced a somewhat alien approach with tools more akin to those of
dynamical systems theory than statistical mechanics.
To explain the method, we return to our stalwart Ising model. Suppose we
coarse-grain a 2-D Ising model by replacing 3 × 3 blocks of spins with a single
spin pointing in the same direction as the majority in the original block. This
gives us a new Ising system with a longer distance between lattice sites, and
possibly a different coupling strength. You could look at this coarse-graining
procedure as a transformation in the Hamiltonian describing the system. Since
the Hamiltonian is characterized by the coupling strength, we can also describe
the coarse-graining as a transformation in the coupling parameter. Let K be the
coupling strength of the original system, and R be the relevant transformation.
The new coupling strength is K ′ = RK. This coarse-graining procedure could
be iterated, producing a sequence of coupling parameters, each related to the
previous one by the transformation R. The transformation defines a flow on
parameter space.
How does this help us ascertain the critical behavior of a system? If you look
at an Ising system at its critical point, you will see clusters of correlated spins of
all sizes. This is a manifestation of the diverging correlation length. Now squint,
blurring out the smaller clusters. The new blurry system that you see will have
the same general structure as the old one. You will still see clusters of all sizes.
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This sort of scale invariance is characteristic of critical behavior. The system
has no characteristic length scale. Coarse-graining produces a new system that
is statistically identical to the old one. At this point, the Hamiltonian of the
system remains the same under indefinite coarse-graining, so it must be a fixed
point in parameter space, i.e. a point Kf such that Kf = RKf . The non-trivial
(viz. notK = 0 orK =∞) fixed points of the flow characterize the Hamiltonian
of the system at the critical point, the point at which correlation length diverges
and there is no characteristic scale for the system. The critical exponents can
be calculated by series expansions near the critical point. Critical exponents
predicted by renormalization group methods agree with experiment much more
than the predictions of mean field theory.
The same approach can be applied to systems with more complicated Hamil-
tonians involving a number of different parameters. Some of these parameters
will be relevant, which means they get bigger as the system is rescaled. If a sys-
tem has a non-zero value for some relevant parameter, then it will not settle at
a non-trivial fixed point upon rescaling, since rescaling will amplify the relevant
parameter and therefore change the couplings in the system. At criticality, then,
the relevant parameters must be zero. An example of a relevant parameter for
the Ising system is the reduced temperature t. If t = 0, the system can flow to a
non-trivial fixed point. However, if t is perturbed from zero, the system will flow
away from this critical fixed point towards a trivial fixed point. So a continuous
transition only takes place when t = 0, which is at the critical temperature.
Other parameters might turn out to be irrelevant at large scales. They will get
smaller and smaller with successive coarse-grainings, effectively disappearing at
macroscopic scales. This elimination of microscopic degrees of freedom means
that the renormalization group transformation can be irreversible (which would,
strictly speaking, make it a semi-group rather than a group), and there can be
attractors in parameter space. These are fixed points into which a number
of microscopically distinct systems flow. This is the basis of universality, the
shared critical behavior of quite different sorts of systems. If the systems share
a fixed point their critical exponents will be the same, even if their microscopic
Hamiltonians are distinct. The differences in the Hamiltonians are in irrelevant
degrees of freedom that do not affect the macroscopic critical behavior of the
system. Systems that flow to the same non-trivial fixed point are said to belong
to the same universality class. The liquid-gas transition in water is in the same
universality class as the paramagnetism-ferromagnetism transition. They have
the same critical exponents, despite the evident differences between the systems.
The difference between relevant and irrelevant parameters can be conceptu-
alized geometrically. In parameter space, if we restrict ourselves to the hyper-
surface on which all relevant parameters are zero, so that the differences between
systems on this hyper-surface are purely due to irrelevant parameters, then all
points on the hyper-surface will flow to a single fixed point. Perturb the system
so that it is even slightly off the hyper-surface, however, and the flow will take
it to a different fixed point.
It is significant that the fixed point only appears when the system has no
characteristic length scale. This is why the infinite particle limit is crucial to
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the renormalization group approach. If the number of particles is finite, then
there will be a characteristic length scale set by the size of the system. Coarse-
graining beyond this length will no longer give us statistically identical systems.
The possibility of invariance under indefinite coarse-graining requires an infi-
nite system. The requirement for the thermodynamic limit in renormalization
group theory can be perspicuously connected to the motivation for this limit in
the standard statistical mechanical story. The correlation length of a system
near its critical point can be characterized in terms of some second derivative
of a thermodynamic potential. For instance, in a magnetic system the range
of correlations between parts of the system is proportional to the susceptibility,
a second derivative of the free energy. On the thermodynamic treatment, the
susceptibility diverges as we approach the critical point, and according to the
statistical mechanical treatment this is impossible unless we are in the thermo-
dynamic limit. This means the correlation length cannot diverge, as is required
for renormalization group methods to work, unless the system is infinite.
2 The Emergence of Phase Transitions?
All of the above should sound a little troubling. After all, the systems we’re
interested in, the systems in which we see phase transitions every day, are not in-
finite systems. Yet the physics of phase transitions seems to make crucial appeal
to the infinitude of the systems modeled. It appears that, according to both sta-
tistical mechanics and renormalization group theory, phase transitions cannot
occur in finite systems. Additionally, the explanation of the universal behavior
of systems near their critical point seems to require the infinite idealization.
Considerations of this sort have led many authors to say that phase transitions
are genuinely emergent phenomena, suggesting that statistical mechanics can-
not provide a full reductive account of phase transitions in finite systems. The
eminent statistical mechanic Lebowitz says phase transitions are “paradigms of
emergent behavior,” (Lebowitz, 1999, p. S346) and the philosopher Liu says
they are “truly emergent properties” (Liu, 1999, p. S92).
Needless to say, if this claim is correct, phase transitions present a challenge
to philosophers with a reductionist bent. The extent of this challenge depends
on how we interpret the claim of emergence. The concept of “emergence” is no-
toriously slippery, interpreted differently by different authors. We will consider
a number of different arguments for phase transitions being emergent, corre-
sponding to varying conceptions of emergence. What these arguments have in
common is that they all involve a rejection of what Andrew Melnyk has called
“reductionism in the core sense” (Melnyk, 2003, p. 83). This is the intuitive
conception of reduction that underlies various more precise philosophical ac-
counts of reduction. A theory Th reduces to a lower-level theory Tl if all the
nomic claims made by Th can be explained using only the resources of Tl and
necessary truths.
This conception is deliberately vague, allowing for various precisifications
depending on one’s theory of explanation, and how one delineates the explana-
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tory resources available to a particular theory. One possible precisification is
Ernest Nagel’s account of reduction (Nagel, 1979), which says that Tl reduces
Th if and only if the laws of the latter can be deduced from the laws of the
former in conjunction with appropriate bridge laws. In this account the core
sense of reduction has been filled out with a logical empiricist theory of explana-
tion according to which the explanatory resources of a theory are the deductive
consequences of its law-like statements. It is important to recognize that a
reductionist is committed to this account of reduction only in so far as she en-
dorses such a theory of explanation. The proper motivation for Nagel’s theory
lies in the extent to which it successfully captures the core sense of reduction.
In this chapter we do not endorse any particular account of reduction. In-
stead we consider three broad ways in which the explanatory connection be-
tween a higher level theory and a lower level theory may break down, and
examine the extent to which these explanatory breakdowns are manifested in
the case of phase transitions. Whether or not we have a genuine explanatory
failure in a particular instance will depend on the details of our account of ex-
planation. Often, the reductionist may be able to avoid a counterexample by
simply re-conceiving what counts as an adequate explanation.1 However, cer-
tain instances will be regarded as explanatory failures under a wide variety of
plausible accounts of explanation, perhaps even under all plausible accounts of
explanation. The weaker the assumptions about explanation required for the
counterexample to work, the stronger the case for emergentism. We can ar-
range our examples of purported explanatory failure into a hierarchy based on
the constraints placed on an account of explanation.
At the bottom of this hierarchy (at least for the purposes of this chapter)
is conceptual novelty. This is the sort of “irreducibility” involved when there is
some natural kind in the higher level theory which cannot be equated to a single
natural kind in the lower level theory. It may be the case that the phenomena
that constitute the higher level kind can be individually explained by the lower
level theory, but the theory does not unite them as a single kind. Conceptual
novelty involves a failure of type-type reduction, but need not involve a failure
of token-token reduction. In the case of phase transitions, it has been suggested
that although one can provide a perfectly adequate explanation of individual
transitions using statistical mechanics, the theory does not distinguish these
phenomena as a separate kind. For instance, from the perspective of statistical
mechanics, the transition from ice to water in a finite system as we cross 273.16 K
is not qualitatively different from the transition from cold ice to slightly warmer
ice as we cross 260 K, at least if something like the standard story is correct.
The only difference is that the thermodynamic potentials change a lot more
rapidly in the former situation than in the latter, but they are still analytic, so
this is merely a difference of degree, not a difference of kind.
1As an example, consider multiple realization, often presented as a failure of reduction.
However, it is only a failure if we believe that a lower-level explanation of the higher-level law
must be unified, i.e. the explanation must be the same for every instance of the higher-level
law. If we are willing to allow for disunified explanation, then we may indeed have a genuine
lower-level explanation of the higher-level law, preserving the core sense of reduction.
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There are two tacks one can take in response to this observation. The first
is that this is a case where statistical mechanics corrects thermodynamics. Just
as it showed us that the second law is not in principle exceptionless, it shows us
that rigorous separation of phases, the only phenomenon worthy of the name
“phase transition”, is only possible in infinite systems. This view of the emer-
gence of phase transitions is expressed by Kadanoff when he says that “in some
sense phase transitions are not exactly embedded in the finite world but, rather,
are products of the human imagination.” (Kadanoff, 2009, p. 778) Thermody-
namics classifies a set of empirical phenomena as phase transitions, involving a
qualitatively distinct type of change in the system. Statistical mechanics reveals
that these phenomena have been misclassified. They are not genuinely quali-
tatively distinct and should not be treated as a separate natural kind. This
response does not appear to pose much of a threat to reductionism. It may
be true that thermodynamics hasn’t been reduced to statistical mechanics in
a strict Nagelian sense, but this seems like much too restrictive a conception
of reduction. There are many paradigmatic cases of scientific reduction where
the reducing theory explains a corrected version of the reduced theory, not the
theory in its original form. This correction may often involve dissolving inappro-
priate distinctions. If this is all there is to the challenge of conceptual novelty,
it is not much of a challenge.
However, one might want to resist this eliminativism and reject the notion
that thermodynamics has misclassified phenomena. Perhaps the right thing to
say is that at the thermodynamic level of description it is indeed appropriate to
have a distinct kind corresponding to phase transitions in finite systems. But
the appropriateness of this kind is invisible at the statistical mechanical level of
description, since statistical mechanics does not have the resources to construct
such a class. This is a more substantive challenge to reductionism, akin to cases
of multiple realizability. As an analogy, consider that from the perspective of
our molecular theory there is no natural kind (or indeed finite disjunction of
kinds) corresponding to the category “can opener”. It seems implausible that
we will be able to delineate the class of can openers using only the resources of
our microscopic theory. Yet we do not take this to mean that our microscopic
theory corrects our macroscopic theory, demonstrating that can openers do not
exist as a separate kind. Can openers do exist. They are an appropriate theo-
retical kind at a certain level of description. Similarly, the fact that statistical
mechanics does not have the resources to delineate the class of finite particle
phase transitions need not lead us to conclude that this classification is bogus.
How might the reductionist respond to conceptual novelty of this sort? One
response would be to develop a sense of explanation that makes reduction com-
patible with multiple realization. Even though statistical mechanics does not
group phase transitions together the way that thermodynamics does, it is still
able to fully explain what goes on in individual instances of phase transition.
Perhaps the existence of individual explanations in every case constitutes an
adequate explanation of the nomic pattern described by thermodynamics. If
this is the case, the core sense of reduction is satisfied. One does not need
to look at phase transitions to notice that any claim about the reduction of
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thermodynamics to statistical mechanics must be based on a conception of re-
duction that is compatible with multiple realizability. Temperature, that most
basic of thermodynamic properties, is not (the claims of numerous philosophers
notwithstanding) simply “mean molecular kinetic energy”. It is a multiply re-
alizable functional kind. If our notion of reduction precludes the existence of
such properties, then the project of reducing thermodynamics cannot even get
off the ground.
To us, this seems like the correct response to claims of emergence based
on the conceptual novelty of phase transitions. If this is all it takes for emer-
gence, then practically every thermodynamic property is emergent. Perhaps
the emergentist is willing to bite this bullet, but we think it is more plausible
that that the argument from conceptual novelty to emergence relies on a much
too restrictive conception of scientific explanation. It is, however, worth not-
ing another line of response. It may be the case that a class of finite particle
phase transitions can be constructed within statistical mechanics that overlaps
somewhat (but not completely) with the thermodynamic classification. This
would be a case of statistical mechanics correcting thermodynamics, but not by
eliminating the phenomenon of phase transitions in finite systems. Instead, sta-
tistical mechanics would re-define phase transitions in a manner that preserves
our judgments about a number of empirical instances of the phenomenon. If
such a re-definition could be engineered, phase transitions would not be concep-
tually novel to thermodynamics. The prospects for this strategy are discussed
in section 3.1.
Let us suppose our conception of reduction is broad enough that mere con-
ceptual novelty does not indicate a failure of reduction. We accept with equa-
nimity that under certain conditions it might be appropriate to model phenom-
ena using a conceptual vocabulary distinct from that of our reducing theory. For
instance, at a sufficiently coarse-grained level of description a certain set of ther-
modynamic transformations is fruitfully modeled as exhibiting singular behav-
ior, and appropriately grouped together into a separate natural kind. However,
one might not think that a fully reductive explanation has been given unless
one can explain using the resources of the reducing theory why this model is so
effective under those conditions. Why does modeling a finite particle phase tran-
sition as non-analytic work so well at the thermodynamic level of description
if finite systems cannot exhibit non-analyticities at the statistical mechanical
level of description? If we cannot give such an explanation, we have another
potential variety of emergence: explanatory irreducibility.
To give an idea of the kind of story we are looking for, consider the infinite
idealization involved in explaining the extensivity of certain thermodynamic
properties. Many thermodynamic properties are extensive, such as the entropy,
internal energy, volume, and free energy. What this means is that if we divide
a system into macroscopic parts, the values of those properties behave in an
additive way. Loosely put, if we double the size of the system (that is, double
internal energy, particle number, volume), then we double that system’s ex-
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tensive properties, e.g., the entropy.2 Intensive properties, by contrast, don’t
scale this way; for example, if we double the size of a system, we don’t dou-
ble the pressure. Extensivity and intensivity are features usefully employed by
phenomenological thermodynamics. However, when we look at a system mi-
croscopically, we quickly see that no finite system is ever strictly extensive or
intensive. Correlations exist between the particles in one part of a system and
another part. If we want to reproduce the thermodynamic distinction exactly,
we are stymied: no matter how large the system, if it’s finite, surface effects
contribute to the partition function, which will mean that systems’ energies and
entropies cannot be neatly halved. For instance, if we define the entropy as
a function over the joint probability distributions involved (as with the Gibbs
entropy), we see that the entropy is extensive only when the two subsystems are
probabilistically independent of one another. The only place we can reproduce
the sharp distinction is by going to the thermodynamic limit. There we can
define a variable f as extensive if f goes to infinity as we approach the ther-
modynamic limit while f/V is constant in the limit, where V is the volume of
the system.3 Strictly speaking, only in infinite systems are entropy, energy, etc.
truly extensive.
Does this fact imply that there is a great mystery about extensivity, that
extensivity is truly emergent, that thermodynamics doesn’t reduce to finite N
statistical mechanics? We suggest that on any reasonably uncontentious way
of defining these terms, the answer is no. We know exactly what is happening
here. Just as the second law of thermodynamics is no longer strict when we go
to the microlevel, neither is the concept of extensivity. The notion of extensivity
is an idealization, but it is one approximated well by finite particle statistical
mechanics. For boxes of length l containing particles interacting via short-range
forces, the surface effects scale as l2 and the volume as l3. Surface effects be-
come less and less important as the system gets larger. Beings restricted to
macroscopic physics would do well to call upon the extensive/intensive distinc-
tion, since in most cases the impact of surface effects would be well beyond the
precision of measurements made by such beings. Here we see that extensivity
in finite systems is conceptually novel to thermodynamics. It does not exist in
statistical mechanics. However, leaving the story there is unsatisfactory. We
need a further account, from a statistical mechanical perspective, of why this
new concept works so well in thermodynamics. And indeed such a story is forth-
coming. It relies crucially on the fact that the resolution of our measurements
is limited, but this in itself does not, or at least should not, derail the reduc-
tionist project. As long as we have a story that explains why beings with such
limitations could fruitfully describe sufficiently large systems as extensive – a
story in terms of the components of the system and their organization, and how
2Strictly speaking, additivity and extensivity are different properties; see Touchette (2002).
Since they overlap for many real systems, they are commonly run together; however, it’s a
mistake to do so in general, for some quantities scale with particle number N (and hence are
extensive), yet are not additive.
3Some textbooks even go in the other direction, namely, defining the thermodynamic limit
as that state wherein entropy and energy are extensive.
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relevant quantities scale as the system gets larger – we do not have a genuine
challenge to reductionism in the core sense.
The question is whether a similar sort of explanation is available to account
for the efficacy of the infinite idealization involved in the statistical mechanical
analysis of phase transitions. If there is not, we would have a case for emergence.
There would be something about the systems under consideration that could
not be accounted for reductively, viz. the fact that their behavior at a phase
transition can, under certain conditions, be adequately modeled as the behavior
of an infinite system. This feature of finite systems is crucial to understanding
their behavior at phase transitions, so if it cannot be explained it would be legit-
imate to say that phase transitions are emergent. In section 3.2 we examine the
possibility of a reductive explanation of the efficacy of the inifinite idealization.
Modelling the behavior of particular systems is not the only function of the
infinite idealization in the study of phase transitions. The idealization plays a
central role in the renormalization group explanation for universal behavior at
the critical point. As we have discussed above, universal behavior is accounted
for by the presence of stable fixed points in the space of Hamiltonians, each of
which is the terminus of a number of different renormalization flow trajectories.
This sort of explanation raises special problems that do not arise when we con-
sider the sort of infinite idealization involved in the assumption of extensivity.
There we have a property that, as it turns out, can only be approximated by
finite systems. It is only actually instantiated in infinite systems. However, the
property itself can be characterized without recourse to the infinite idealization.
I could in principle construct an explanation of why a finite thermodynamic
system approximates extensive behavior without any appeal to the infinite ide-
alization. The idealization gives us a model of a genuinely extensive system, but
it is not essential to an understanding of why it is useful to treat macroscopic
finite systems as extensive.
It appears that the situation is different when we consider the renormaliza-
tion group explanation of universality. There, the infinite idealization plays a
different role. Talking about how a particular large finite system approximates
the behavior of an infinite system will not be helpful, because universality is not
about the behavior of individual systems, finite or infinite. It is a characteristic
of classes of systems. The renormalization group method explains why physical
systems separate into distinct universality classes, and it explains this in terms
of certain structural features of the space of systems, the fixed points of the
renormalization flow. It is the existence of these features, and their connection
to the phonemenon of universality, that requires the infinite idealization. We
might be able to give an account of why a particular large finite system ap-
proaches very close a fixed point as it is rescaled, approximating the behavior
of an infinite system, but this will not tell us why this behavior matters. In
order to see the connection between approaching a fixed point and exhibiting
universal behavior, we need the infinite idealization. This argument is made in
Batterman (2011). We address it in section 4.
In a case of explanatory irreducibility the higher level theory models a par-
ticular phenomenon in a conceptually novel manner, and the efficacy of this
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model cannot be explained by the lower level theory. However, this does not
preclude the possibility that the phenomenon can be modeled within the lower
level theory in a different way. There may be aspects of the phenomenon (such
as, say, its macroscopic similarity to other phenomena) that cannot be captured
by the descriptive resources of the theory, but the phenomenon itself can be
described by the theory. Consider, for instance, the relationship between neuro-
science and folk psychology. It might be argued that the latter is explanatorily
irreducible to the former. Perhaps there is no viable neuroscientific account of
why the reasons explanations common in folk psychology are successful, but
a materialist about the mind could maintain that this is merely because the
neuroscientific theory operates at too fine a scale to discern the patterns that
ground this sort of explanation. In every token instance covered by the folk
psychological explanation, there is nothing relevant going on that isn’t captured
by neuroscience. It’s just that the way neuroscience describes what is going on
isn’t conducive to the construction or justification of reasons explanations. The
patterns which the neuroscientific description fails to see are nonetheless wholly
generated by processes describable using neuroscience.
A substance dualist, however, would argue that there is an even deeper
failure of reduction going on here. The phenomena and processes described by
neuroscience are by themselves inadequate to even generate the kinds of patterns
that characterize reasons explanations. This is because the lower level theory
does not have the resources to describe a crucial element of the ontological
furniture of the situation, the mind or the soul. Here we have more than a mere
case of explanatory irreducibility. We may call cases like this, where the lower
level theory cannot even fully describe a phenomenon that can be modeled by
the higher level theory, examples of ontological irreducibility.
This is probably the sense in which the British emergentists conceived of
emergence (see McLaughlin (1992) for an illuminating analysis of this school of
thought). With reference to phase transitions, this view is perhaps most starkly
expressed in Batterman (2005). Batterman argues that the discontinuity in the
thermodynamic potential at a phase transition is not an artifact of a particular
mathematical representation of the physical phenomenon, but is a feature of the
physical phenomenon itself. He says, “My contention is that thermodynamics
is correct to characterize phase transitions as real physical discontinuities and
it is correct to represent them mathematically as singularities.” (ibid., p. 234)
If there are genuine discontinuities in physical systems, it seems we could not
represent them accurately using only continuous mathematical functions. So,
since the statistical mechanics of finite systems does not give us discontinuities,
it is incapable of fully describing this physical phenomenon. We can only ap-
proach an explanation of the phenomenon by working in the infinite limit. The
idealization is a manifestation of the inability of the theory to fully describe
the phenomenon of phase transitions in finite systems. We discuss these ideas
further in section 3.3.
In the remainder of this paper, we discuss the status of these three notions
of emergence – conceptual novelty, explanatory irreducibility and ontological as
they apply to both the standard statistical mechanical notion of phase transi-
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tions and the treatment of critical phenomena by the renormalization group.
These topics are treated separately because, as discussed above, the renormal-
ization group introduces new issues bearing on the topic of emergence and reduc-
tion that go beyond issues involving infinite idealization in traditional statistical
mechanics.
3 The Infinite Idealization in Statistical Mechan-
ics
In the previous section, we discussed three ways in which the relationship be-
tween statistical mechanics and thermodynamics might be non-reductive. There
is a hierarchy to these different senses of emergence set by the varying strengths
of the assumptions about explanation required in order for them to represent a
genuine failure of the core sense of reduction. Conceptual novelty is the weak-
est notion of emergence, explanatory irreducibility is stronger, and ontological
irreducibility is stronger still. In this section, we discuss the case that can be
made for phase transitions exemplifying each of these notions of emergence.
We conclude that in the domain of ordinary statistical mechanics (excluding
the renormalization group), the case for phase transitions being either ontolog-
ically or explanatorily irreducible is weak. The case for phase transitions being
conceptually novel is stronger, but even here there are questions that can be
raised.
3.1 Conceptual Novelty
A natural kind in a higher level theory is conceptually novel if there is no kind
in any potential reducing theory that captures the same set of phenomena. Are
thermodynamic phase transitions conceptually novel? That is, does the kind
‘phase transition’ have a natural counterpart kind in statistical mechanics? If
we restrict ourselves to finite N systems, it’s commonly believed that there is not
a kind in statistical mechanics corresponding to phase transitions and that one
can only find such a kind in infinite N statistical mechanics. We believe, to the
contrary, that no theory, infinite or finite, statistical mechanical or mechanical,
possesses a natural kind that perfectly overlaps with the thermodynamic natural
kind. Yet if one relaxes the demand of perfect overlap, then then there are
kinds – even in finite N statistical mechanics – that overlap in interesting and
explanatorily powerful ways with thermodynamic phase transitions. Strictly
speaking, thermodynamic phase transitions are conceptually novel; more loosely
speaking, they are not.
To begin, one might wonder in what sense ‘phase transition’ is a kind even in
thermodynamics. After all, there are ambiguities in the way we define phases. Is
glass a super-cooled liquid or a solid? It depends on which criteria one uses and
no set seems obviously superior. Be that as it may, the notion of a transition is
relatively clear in thermodynamics, and it is defined, as above, as a discontinuity
in one of the thermodynamic potentials. Let’s stick with this.
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Now, is the kind picked out by Def 1 the counterpart of the thermodynamic
definition? Despite many claims that it is, Def 1’s extension is clearly very
different than that given by thermodynamics. To mention the most glaring
difference – and on which, more later – there are many systems that do not have
well-defined thermodynamic limits. Do they not have phase transitions? One
can define words as one likes, but the point is that there are many systems that
suffer abrupt macroscopic changes, changes that thermodynamics would count
as phase transitions, but which do not have thermodynamic limits. Systems with
very long-range interactions are prominent examples. But in fact the conditions
on the existence of a thermodynamic limit are numerous and stringent, so in
some sense most systems don’t have thermodynamic limits. A strong case can
be made that Def 1, as a result, provides at best sufficient conditions for a phase
transition, and not necessary conditions.
How does finite N statistical mechanics fare? The conventional wisdom is
that finite N statistical mechanics lacks the resources to have counterparts of
thermodynamics phase transitions. However, we believe that people often as-
sent to this claim too quickly. One of the more interesting developments in
statistical mechanics of late has been challenges to ordinary statistical mechan-
ics from the realms of the very large and the very small. These are regimes
that test the applicability of normal Boltzmann-Gibbs equilibrium statistical
mechanics. The issues arise from the success of statistical mechanical tech-
niques in new areas. In cosmology, statistical mechanics is used not only to
explain the inner workings of stars but also to explain the statistical distribu-
tion of galaxies, clusters and more. In these cases, the force of interest is of
course the gravitational force, one that is not screened at short distances like
the Coulomb force. Systems like this do not have a well-defined thermodynamic
limit, often aren’t approximately extensive, suffer negative heat capacities, and
more (see Callender (2011) for discussion). There has also been an extension
of statistical mechanical techniques to the realm of the small. Sodium clusters
obey a solid-like to liquid-like “phase transition”, Bose-Einstein condensation
occurs, and much more. These atomic clusters have been surprisingly amenable
to statistical mechanical treatment, yet they too don’t satisfy the conditions for
the application of the thermodynamic limit. Physically, one way to think about
what is happening here is that in small systems a much higher proportion of the
particles reside on the surface, so surface effects play a substantial role in the
physics. As a result, these systems also raise issues about extensivity, negative
specific heats, and much more.4
These systems are relevant to our concerns here for a very simple reason:
they appear to have phase transitions, yet lack a well-defined thermodynamic
limit, so Def 1 seems inadequate. Orthogonal to our philosophical worries about
4For the thermodynamic limit to exist, two conditions on the potential in the Hamiltonian
must be satisfied, one on large distances, one on small distances. These extensions can be
viewed as challenges in either length scale. In another sense, however, one can view both
types of systems as unified together as “small” systems. If we define a system as “small” if its
spatial extension is less than the range of its dominant interaction, then even galactic clusters
are small.
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reduction, there are also purely physical motivations for better understanding
thermodynamic phase transitions from the perspective of finite statistical me-
chanics. Naturally, some physicists appear motivated by both issues, the con-
ceptual and the physical:
Conceptually, the necessity of the thermodynamic limit is an
objectionable feature: first, the number of degrees of freedom in real
systems, although possibly large, is finite, and, second, for systems
with long-range interactions, the thermodynamic limit may even be
not well defined. These observations indicate that the theoretical
description of phase transitions, although very successful in certain
aspects, may not be completely satisfactory. (Kastner 2008, 168)
As a result of this motivation, there are already several proposals for finite-
particle accounts of phase transitions. These are sometimes called smooth phase
transitions. The research is ongoing, but what exists already provides evidence
of the existence of thermodynamic phase transitions in finite systems. There
are many different schemes, but we’ll concentrate on the two most well-known.
3.1.1 Back Bending
Inspired in part by van der Waals theory and its S-shaped bends, this theory
has been developed by Wales and Berry (1994), Gross and Votyakov (2000) and
Chomaz, Gulminelli, and Duflot (2001). Unlike in the traditional theory of phase
transitions, here the authors work with the microcanonical ensemble, not the
canonical ensemble. The general idea is that the signatures of phase transitions
of different orders are read off from the curvature of the microcanonical entropy,
S = kb ln Ω(E), where Ω(E) is the microcanonical partition function. In partic-
ular, if written in terms of the associated caloric curve, T (E) = 1/∂E ln[Ω(E)],
we can understand a first-order transition as a “back-bending” curve, where for
a given value of T (E) one can have more than one set of values for E/N (see
figure 1). For our illustrative purposes we’ll use this as our definition:
(Def 2) A first-order phase transition occurs when there is “back bending” in
the microcanonical caloric curve.
(Def 2) is equivalent to the entropy being convex or the heat capacity being
negative for certain values. As expected, back-bending can be seen in finite-N
systems. So with Def 2 we have an alternative criterion of phase transitions
that nicely characterizes phase transitions even in systems that do not have
thermodynamic limits. We hasten to add that the theory is not exhuasted by a
simple definition. Rather, the hope – which has to some extent been realized –is
that it and its generalizations can predict and explain both continuous phase
transitions and also phase transitions in systems lacking a thermodynamic limit.
Def 2 is rather striking when one realizes that it is equivalent to a region
of negative heat capacities appearing. The reader familiar with the van Hove
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Figure 1: Backbending of the caloric curve.
theorem may be alarmed, for that theorem forbids back-bending in the thermo-
dynamic limit. Since our concerns are about the finite case, this in itself isn’t
troubling. But if one hopes that this definition goes over to the infinite N defi-
nition in the thermodynamic limit, where ensemble equivalence holds for many
systems, this might be a problem: the canonical ensemble can never have nega-
tive heat capacity, whereas the microcanonical one can, and yet they’re equiv-
alent for “normal” short-range systems in the thermodynamic limit. Doesn’t
“ensemble equivalence” in the infinite limit squeeze out these negative heat ca-
pacities? No, for one must remember that ensemble equivalence holds, where
it does, only when systems aren’t undergoing phase transitions. This is a point
originally made by Gibbs (1902). And indeed, ensemble inequivalence can be
used as a marker of phase transitions. What is happening is that the micro-
canonical ensemble has structure that the canonical ensemble cannot see; the
regions of back-bending (or convex entropy, or negative heat capacity) are missed
by the canonical ensemble. Yet since the canonical ensemble is equivalent to
the microcanonical – if at all – only when no phase transition obtains, there is
no opportunity for conflict with “equivalence” results.
This remark provides a clue to the relation between Def 1 and Def 2, and
a way of thinking about the first as a sub-species of the second. When there
is back-bending there is ensemble inequivalence. From the perspective of the
canonical ensemble for an infinite system, this is where a nonanalyticity appears
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in the thermodynamic limit. It can “see” the phase transition in that case; but
when finite it is blind to this structure. Def 2 can then be seen as more general,
since it triggers the nonanalyticity seen in infinite systems and captured by Def
1, but also applies to finite systems.
Many more interesting facts have recently been unearthed about the rela-
tionships among back-bending, non-concave entropies, negative heat capacity,
ensemble inequivalence, phase transitions, and non-extensivity. We refer the
reader to Touchette and Ellis (2005) for discussion and references. For rigorous
connections between Def 1 and Def 2, see Touchette (2006).
3.1.2 Distribution of Zeros
This approach grows directly out of the Yang-Lee picture. The Yang-Lee the-
orem is about the distribution of zeroes of the grand canonical ensemble’s par-
tition function in the complex plane. A critical point is encountered when this
distribution “pinches” the real axis, and this can only occur when the num-
ber of zeroes is infinite. Fisher and later Grossmann then provided an elabo-
rate classification of phase transitions in terms of the distribution of zeros of
the canonical partition function in the complex temperature plane. Interested
in Bose-Einstein condensation, nuclear fragmentation and other “phase transi-
tions” in small systems, a group of physicists at the University of Oldenburg
sought to extend this approach to the finite case (see Borrmann, Mülken, and
Harting (2000)). For our purposes, we can define their phase transitions as
(Def 3) A phase transition occurs when the zeroes of the canonical partition
function align perpendicularly to the real temperature axis and the density
scales with the number of particles.
The distribution of zeros of a partition function contains a lot of information.
The idea behind this approach is to extract three parameters (α,γ,τ1) from the
partition function that tell us about this distribution: τ1 is a function of the
number of zeros in the complex temperature plane, and it is positive for finite
systems; γ is the crossing angle between the real axis and the line of zeros;
and α is determined from the approximate density of zeros on that line. What
happens as we approach a phase transition is that the distribution of zeros in the
complex temperature plane “line up” and gradually gets denser and straighter
as N increases.5
We stress that, as with the previous group, the physicists involved do not
offer a stray definition but rather a a comprehensive theory of phase transitions
in small systems. In particular, the Oldenburg group can use this theory to
not only predict whether there is a phase transition, but also to identify the
correct order of the transition. Their classification excels when treating Bose-
Einstein condensation, as it reproduces the space dimension and particle number
dependence of the transition order.
5A small movie of this occurring for small magnetic clusters is available at
http://smallsystems.isn-oldenburg.de/movie.gif.
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Figure 2: Distribution of zeroes in the complex inverse temperature (β = 1/kT )
plane.
Like the approach using Def 2, the present approach works for both finite and
infinite systems. For finite systems, τ1is always positive and we look for cases
where α = γ: these correspond to first-order transitions in finite systems. More
complicated relations between α and γ correspond to higher-order transitions.
For infinite systems, phase transitions of the first-order occur when α = γ =
τ1 = 0 and for higher-order when α > 0. So the scheme includes the Def
1 case as a sub-species. One can then view Def 3 – or more accurately, the
whole classification scheme associated with (α,γ,τ1) – as a wider, more general
definition of phase transitions, one including small systems, with Def 1 as a
special case when the thermodynamic limit is legitimate.
What is the relationship between Def 2 and Def 3? It turns out that they
are almost equivalent. Indeed, if one ignores a class of systems that may turn
out to be unphysical, they are demonstrably equivalent; see Touchette (2006)6.
The rich schemes of which these definitions form a part may not be equivalent,
but on the question of what counts as a phase transition they will largely agree.
6This paper shows that yet another definition, one based on a bimodality of the energy
distribution, is almost equivalent to Def 3. However, the bimodality definition is equivalent
to Def 2, so the demonstration links Def 2 and Def 3.
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As a result of the work on finite-N definitions – and while duly recognizing
that it is very much ongoing – it seems to us that statistical mechanics is hardly
at a loss to describe phase transitions in finite systems. The situation instead
seems to us to be more subtle. No definition in statistical mechanics, infinite
or finite, exactly reproduces the extension picked out by thermodynamics with
the kind ‘phase transition.’ What one judges the best definition then hangs on
what extension one wants to preserve. If focusing on thermodynamic systems
possessing thermodynamic limits, then Def 1 is fine. Then the kind ‘phase tran-
sition’ is conceptually emergent relative to finite-N statistical mechanics. But
if impressed by long-range systems, small systems, non-extensive systems, and
“solidlike-to-liquidlike” mesoscopic transitions, then one of the finite-N defini-
tions is necessary. Relative to these definitions, the kind ‘phase transition’ is
not conceptually novel. If one wants a comprehensive definition, for finite and
infinite, then the schemes described provide the best bet. Probably none of
the definitions provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a phase transition
that overlaps perfectly with thermodynamic phase transitions. That, however,
is okay, for thermodynamics itself doesn’t neatly characterize all the ways in
which macrostates can change in an “abrupt” way.
In any case, we don’t believe that conceptual novelty by itself poses a major
threat to reductionism. After all even a (too) strict Nagelian notion of reduction
can accommodate conceptual novelty (as long as the novel higher level kind is
expressible as a finite disjunction of lower level kinds). Conceptual novelty is
only a problem when you don’t have explanatory reducibility of the conceptually
novel kind, a question to which we now turn.
3.2 Explanatory Irreducibility
Explanatory irreducibility occurs, we said, when the explanation of a higher-
level phenomenon requires a conceptual novelty, yet the reducing theory does not
have the resources to explain why the conceptual novelty is warranted.7 Where
7There are some potential connections between “explanatory irreducibility” and notions in
the literature on idealization. In particular, depending upon how one understands Galilean
idealization, it’s possible that a conceptual novelty is explanatorily irreducible just in case it
is not a “harmless” Galilean idealization. Coined by McMullin, a Galilean idealization in a
scientific model is a deliberate distortion of the target system that simplifies, unifies or gen-
erally makes more useful or applicable the model. Crucially, a Galilean idealization is also
one that allows for controlled “de-idealization.” In other words, it allows for adding realism
to the model (at the expense of simplicity or usefulness, to be sure) so that one can see that
the distortions are justified by convenience and are not ad hoc. Idealizations like this are
sometimes dubbed “controllable” idealizations and are widely viewed as harmless. What to
make of such non-Galilean idealizations is an ongoing project in philosophy of science. One
prominent idea – see, e.g., Cartwright (1983) or Strevens (2009) – is that the model may faith-
fully represent the significant causal relationships involved in the real system. The departure
from reality need not then accompany a corresponding lack of faith in the deliverances of the
model. It is possible that we could understand the standard explanation of phase transitions
as a distortion that nonetheless successfully represents the causal relationships of the system.
Perhaps the thermodynamic limit is legitimatized by the fact that surface effects aren’t a
difference-maker (in the sense of Strevens) in the systems of interest. We’ll leave this line of
thought to others to develop.
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phase transitions are especially interesting, philosophically, lies in the fact that,
at first glance, they seem to be a real-life and prominent instance of explanatory
irreducibility. To arrive at this claim, let’s suppose that the finite-N definitions
surveyed above are theoretically inadequate. Assume that Def 1 is employed
in the best explanation of the phenomena. Then we’ve already seen that no
finite-N statistical mechanics can suffer phase transitions so understood. If the
“reducing theory” is finite-N statistical mechanics, then we potentially have a
case of explanatory irreducibility. But should the reducing theory be restricted
to finite-N theory?
One quick way out of difficulty would be to include the thermodynamic
limit as part of the reducing theory. However, this would be a cheat. The
thermodynamic limit is, we believe, the production of another phenomenological
theory, not a piece of the reducing theory. The ontology of the classical reducing
theory is supposed to be finite N classical mechanics. Such a theory has surface
effects, fluctuations, and more, but the thermodynamic limit squashes these out.
More importantly, the ontology of the system in the thermodynamic limit is not
the classical mechanics of billiard balls and the like. A quick and interesting
way to see this point is to note that the thermodynamic limit is mathematically
equivalent to the continuum limit (Compagner, 1989). The continuum limit
is one wherein the size and number of particles is decreased without bound
in a finite-sized volume. When thermodynamic emerges from this limit, it is
emerging from a theory describing continuous matter, not atomistic matter.
New light is shed on all that is regained in the thermodynamic limit if we see it
as regained in the continuum limit. For here we do not see properties emerging
from an atomic microworld behaving thermodynamically, but rather properties
emerging from a continuum, a realm well “above” the atomic. For this reason,
with respect to the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, we
do not see proofs that thermodynamic properties emerge in the thermodynamic
limit as cases whereby thermodynamic properties are reduced to mechanical
properties.
If this is right, then we have a potential case of explanatory irreducibility.
The best explanation of the phenomenon of phase transitions contains an ide-
alization whose efficacy cannot be explained from the perspective of finite-N
theory. So are phase transitions actually explanatorily irreducible? The answer
hangs on whether de-idealization can be achieved within finite-N statistical me-
chanics. We believe that it can be. We have already hinted at one possibility.
If one could show that one or more of the finite-N definitions approximate in a
controlled way Def 1, then we could view Def 1 as “really” talking about one
of the other definitions. Indeed, this seems very much a live possibility with
either Def 2 or Def 3 above. However, suppose we believe that this is not pos-
sible. Is there any other way of de-idealising the standard treatment of phase
transitions? We believe that there is, and both Butterfield (2011) and Kadanoff
(2009) point toward the right diagnosis.
Before getting to that, however, notice that the actual practice of the science
more or less guarantees that some finite-N approximation must be available. In
recent years there has been an eﬄorescence of computational models of statis-
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tical mechanical phenomena (see Krauth (2006)). Since we cannot simulate an
infinite system, these models give an inkling of how we might approximate the
divergences associated with critical behavior in a finite system. Consider, for
instance, the Monte Carlo implementation of the Ising model (see, for instance,
Wolff (1989)). The Monte Carlo method involves picking some probabilistic
algorithm for propagating fluctuations in the lattice configuration of an Ising
system as time evolves. Each run of the simulation is a random walk through
the space of configurations, and we study the statistical properties of ensembles
of these walks.
It might be argued that the system size in these simulations is effectively infi-
nite, since the lattice is usually implemented with periodic boundary conditions.
However, this periodicity should be interpreted merely as a computational tool,
not as a simulation of infinite system size. The algorithm is supposed to study
the manner in which fluctuations propagate through the lattice, but the model
will only work if the correlation length is less than the periodicity of the system.
If fluctuations propagate over scales larger than the periodicity, we will have a
conflict between the propagation of fluctuations and the constraints set by the
periodicity of boundary conditions. So the periodic boundary conditions should
be interpreted as setting an effective system size. The model is only useful as
long as the correlation length remains below this characteristic length scale.
Unfortunately, the periodic boundary conditions also mean that the model is
not accurate at the critical point, only close to it. As the correlation length
approaches system size in a real system, surface effects become relevant, and
the simulation neglects these effects.
Nonetheless, the Monte Carlo method does allow us to see how Ising systems
approach critical behavior near the critical point. For instance, models exhibit
the increase of correlation length as the critical point is approached, and the
associated slow-down of equilibriation (due to the increased length over which
fluctuations propagate). As we construct larger and larger systems, the model
is precise closer and closer to the critical point, and we can see the correla-
tion length get larger. We can also model the non-equilibrium phenomenon of
avalanches, where the order parameter of the system changes in a series of sharp
jumps as the external parameter in the Hamiltonian is varied. As an example,
the magnetization of a magnetic material exhibits avalanches as the external
field is tuned. The avalanches are due to the way in which fluctuations of clus-
ters of spins trigger further fluctuations. At the critical point, we get avalanches
of all sizes. Again, the approach to this behavior can be studied by examin-
ing the how the distribution of avalanches changes as the system approaches
the critical point. These are just some examples of how finite models can be
constructed to examine the behavior of a system arbitrarily close to the criti-
cal point. These models fail sufficiently close to criticality because they do not
adequately deal with boundary effects. However, they do give an indication of
how the behavior of large finite systems can be seen as smoothly approximating
the behavior of infinite systems.
We now turn to a more explicit attempt to understand the idealization.
Butterfield (2011, §3.3 and §7) thinks the treatment of phase transitions doesn’t
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occasion any great mystery. We agree, and reproduce his mathematical analogy
(with slight modifications) to illustrate the point. Consider a sequence of real
functions gN , where N ranges over the natural numbers. For each value of N ,
the function gN (x) is continuous. It is equal to -1 when x is less than or equal
to −1/N , increases linearly with slope N when x is between −1/N and 1/N ,
and then stays at 1 when x is greater than or equal to 1/N . The slope of the
segment connecting the two constant segments of the function gets steeper and
steeper as N increases.
While every member of this sequence of functions is continuous, the limit of
the sequence g∞(x) is discontinuous at x = 0. Now consider another another




0, gN (x) is continuous at x
1, gN (x) is discontinuous at x
Given these definitions, fN (x) is the constant zero function for all N . If we just
look at the sequence of functions, we would expect the limit of the sequence fN
as N → ∞ to also be constant. However, if we construct f∞(x) from g∞(x)
using the above definition, we will not get a constant function. The function
will be discontinuous; it will take on the value 1 at x = 0. If one focuses only
on fN without paying attention to how it is generated from gN , the behavior in
the limit will seem mysterious and inexplicable given the behavior at finite N .
Imagine that we represent a physical property in a model in terms of fN (x)
taking on the value 1, where N is a measure of the size of the physical system.
This property can only be exemplified in the infinite-N limit, of course. And if
we restricted ourselves to considering fN when trying to explain the property,
we would be at a loss. No matter how big N gets, as long as it is finite there
is no notion of being nearer or further away from the property obtaining. We
might conclude that the property is emergent in the infinite limit, since we can’t
“de-idealize” as we did in the case of extensivity and show how a finite system
approximates this property. However, this is only because we are not paying
attention to the gN (x). Realizing the relationship between fN and gN allows
us to account for the behavior of fN in the infinite limit from a finite system
perspective, since there is a clear sense in which the functions gN approach
discontinuity as N approaches infinity.
We might put the point as follows. Suppose we have a theory of some
physical property that utilizes the predicates g, N , and x. Suppose further that
we are particularly interested in the rapid increase in gN (x) around x = 0 when
N is large. Rather than analyze of gN (x) for particular finite values of N , it
might make sense from a computational perspective to work with the infinite
idealization g∞(x), where the relevant behavior is stark and localized at x = 0.
We may introduce a new “kind” represented by the predicate f that picks out
the phenomenon of interest in the infinite limit. This kind is conceptually novel
to the {g, N , x} framework. Indeed, one can imagine a whole theory written
in terms of f , without reference to g. Using such a theory it could be difficult
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to see how f is approximated by some function of finite-N . Because f is two-
valued, the property it represents will appear to just pop into existence in the
infinite limit without being approximated in any way by large finite systems.
Restricted to f (and hence g∞(x)), one wouldn’t have the resources present to
explain how f emerges from the shape of g when N is finite.
This is precisely what happens in phase transitions. As Butterfield shows,
the example of f and g translates nicely into the treatment of phase transitions.
The magnetization in an Ising model behaves like gN (x), where N is the number
of particles and x is the applied field. For finite systems, the transition of the
system between the two phases of magnetization occurs continuously as the
applied field goes from negative to positive. In the infinite case, the transition
is discontinuous. The sequence of functions fN isolate one aspect of the behavior
of the functions gN – whether or not they are continuous. If we just focus on
this property, it might seem like there is entirely novel behavior in the infinite
particle case. The shape of f∞(x) around x = 0 is not in any sense approximated
or approached by fN as N gets large. If it is the case that large finite systems
can be successfully modeled as infinite systems, this might seem to be a sign
of explanatory irreducibility. The success of the infinite particle idealization
cannot be explained because the infinite particle function is not the limit of the
finite particle function sequence fN . The illusion of explanatory irreducibility is
dispelled when we realize that any explanation involving f∞ can be rephrased
in terms of g∞, and the latter function does not display inexplicably novel
behavior. It is in fact the limit of the finite particle functions gN . As N
increases, gN approaches g∞ in a well-defined sense. At a sufficiently large
but finite system size N0, the resolution of our measuring instruments will not
be fine-grained enough to distinguish between gN0(x) and g∞(x). We have an
explanation, much like the one we have for extensivity, of the efficacy of the
infinite idealization.
Recognizing that the predicate f only picks out part of the information
conveyed by the predicate g dissolves the mystery. The new predicate is useful
when we are working with the idealization, but it makes de-idealization a more
involved process. To see the connection between a phase transition defined via
Def 1 and real finite systems, one must first “undo” the conceptual innovation
and write the theory as a limit of nascent functions. At that point one can then
see that the idealization is an innocent simplification and extrapolation of what
happens to certain physical curves when N grows large.8
3.3 Ontological Irreducibility
Ontological irreducibility involves a very strong failure of reduction, and if any
phenomenon deserves to be called emergent, it is one whose description is on-
tologically irreducible to any theory of its parts. Batterman argues that phase
transitions are emergent in this sense (Batterman, 2005). It is not just that we
8Thanks to Jim Weatherall for kick-starting our thinking of phase transitions as delta
functions that can be approximated by analytic functions, and to Jeremy Butterfield for
kindly letting us use an advance copy of his 2010.
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do not know of an adequate statistical mechanical account of them, we cannot
construct such an account. Phase transitions, according to this view, are cases
of genuine physical discontinuities. The discontinuity is there in nature itself.
The thermodynamic representation of these phenomena as mathematical singu-
larities is quite natural on this view. It is hard to see how else to best represent
them. However, canonical statistical mechanics does not allow for mathemat-
ical singularities in thermodynamic functions of finite systems, so it does not
have the resources to adequately represent these physical discontinuities. If the
density of a finite quantity of water does as a matter fact change discontinu-
ously at a phase transition, then it seems that statistical mechanics is incapable
of describing this phenomenon, so the thermodynamics of phase transitions is
genuinely ontologically irreducible.
Why think phase transitions are physically discontinuous? Batterman ap-
peals to the qualitative distinction between the phases of fluids and magnets.
Yet describing the distinction between the phases as “qualitative” is potentially
misleading. It is true that the different phases of certain systems appear macro-
scopically distinct to us. A liquid certainly seems very different from a gas. How-
ever, from a thermodynamic perspective the difference is quantitative. Phases
are distinguished based on the magnitudes of certain thermodynamic parame-
ters. The mere existence of distinct states of the system exhibiting these different
magnitudes does not suggest that there is any discontinuity in the transition be-
tween the systems. This is a point about the mathematical representation, but
the lesson extends to the physical phenomenon. While it is true that the phases
of a system are macroscopically distinct, this is not sufficient to establish that
the physical transition from one of these phases to the other as gross constraints
are altered involves a physical discontinuity.
In order to see whether there really is a discontinuity that is appropriately
modeled as a singularity we need to understand the dynamics of the change
of phase. So we take a closer look at what happens at a first order phase
transition. Consider the standard representation of an isotherm on the liquid-
gas P -V diagram at a phase transition (figure 3). The two black dots are
co-existence points. At these points the pressure on the system is the same,
but the system separates into two distinct phases: low-volume liquid and high-
volume gas. The two co-existence points are connected by a horizontal tie-
line or Maxwell plateau. On this plateau, the system exists as a two-phase
mixture. It is here that the dynamics of interest takes place. However, the
representation above is too coarse-grained to provide a full description of the
behavior of the system at transition. This representation certainly involves a
mathematical singularity: as the pressure is reduced, the volume of the system
changes discontinuously. But a closer look at how the transition takes place
demonstrates that this is just an artifact of the representation, and not an
accurate picture of what is going on at the transition. The P -V diagram ignores
fluctuations, but fluctuations are crucial to the transition between phases. The
process by which this takes place is nucleation. When we increase the pressure
of a gas above the co-existence point it does not instantaneously switch to a
liquid phase. It continues in its gaseous phase, but this super-saturated vapor
27
Figure 3: P − V diagram for a liquid-gas system at a phase transition.
is meta-stable. Thermal fluctuations cause droplets of liquid to nucleate within
the gaseous phase. In this regime, the liquid phase is energetically favored, and
this encourages the expansion of the droplet. However, surface effects at the
gas-liquid interface impede the expansion. When the droplet is small surface
effects predominate, preventing the liquid phase from spreading, but if there
is a fluctuation large enough to push the droplet over a critical radius the free
energy advantage dominates and the liquid phase can spread through the entire
system. A full account of the gas-liquid transition will involve a description of
the process of nucleation, a non-equilibrium phenomenon that is not represented
on the equilibrium P -V diagram in figure 3.
Perhaps the nucleation of droplets from zero radius could be seen as an
example of a physical discontinuity. However, an analysis of this process is
not beyond the reach of finite particle statistical mechanics. We can study the
nucleation of a new phase using the Ising model. As the external field crosses
zero, simulations of the model show that initially local clusters of spins flip.
Some of these clusters are too small, so they shrink back to zero, but once there
is a large enough cluster – a critical droplet – the flipping spreads across the
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entire system and the new phase takes over. All of this is observable in a simple
finite particle Ising system, so the phenomenon of nucleation can be described
by statistical mechanics without having to invoke the thermodynamic limit. If
it is the case that physical discontinuities cannot be accurately described by
statistical mechanics, then we have good reason for believing there are no such
discontinuities in the process of phase transition.
Even if we grant that phase transitions involve a physical discontinuity and
can only be accurately represented by a mathematical singularity, the ontological
irreducibility of the phenomenon does not follow. Very recently it has been
shown that the microcanonical entropy, unlike the canonical free energy, can
be non-analytic for finite systems. And indeed, a research program has sprung
up based on this discovery that tries to link singularities of the microcanonical
entropy to thermodynamic phase transitions (Franzosi, Pettini, and Spinelli
(2000), Kastner (2008)). That program demonstrates that non-analyticities in
the entropy are associated with a change in the topology of configuration space.
Consider the subset of configuration spaceMv that contains all points for which
the potential energy per particle is lower than v. As v is varied, this subset
changes, and at some critical values of v the topological properties of the subset
change. This topology change is marked by a change in the Euler characteristic.
For finite systems, there is a non-analyticity in the entropy wherever there is a
topology change. For infinite systems there is a continuum of points at which the
topology changes , so a straightforward identification of phase transitions with
topology change is inappropriate.9 Nevertheless, it is widely believed that there
is some connection between these finite nonanalyticities and thermodynamic
phase transitions.
This is a fledgling research program and there are still a number of open
questions. It is unclear what topological criteria will be necessary and suffi-
cient to define phase transitions, if any such criteria can be found. What is
important for our purposes is that it is clear that the microcanonical ensem-
ble does exhibit singularities even in the finite particle case, and that there is a
plausible research program attempting to understand phase transitions in terms
of these singularities. As such, it is certainly premature to declare that phase
transitions are ontologically irreducible even if they involve genuine physical dis-
continuities. Statistical mechanics might well have the resources to adequately
represent these discontinuities without having to advert to the thermodynamic
limit.
9The problem with identifying these singularities with phase transitions in thermodynamics
is that as N grows the order of the phase transition also increases, roughly as N/2. These
transitions are far weaker than the ones encountered in thermodynamics, and in any case,
unobservable in real noisy data unless N is really small.
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4 The Infinite Idealization in the Renormaliza-
tion Group
We have argued that there is good reason to think the use of the infinite limit in
the statistical mechanical description of phase transitions does not show that the
phenomenon is either ontologically or explanatorily irreducible. Here we exam-
ine whether similar claims can be made about the way the infinite idealization
is used in renormalization group theory. While this theory is usually included
under the broad rubric of statistical mechanics, there are significant differences
between renormalization group methods and the methods characteristic of sta-
tistical mechanics. Statistical mechanics allows us to calculate the statistical
properties of a system by analyzing an ensemble of similar systems. Renor-
malization group methods enter when correlations within a system extend over
scales long enough to make straightforward ensemble methods impractical (see
Kadanoff (2010a) for more on this distinction). The properties of the system are
calculated not from a single ensemble but from the way in which the ensemble
changes upon re-scaling. In statistical mechanics, the infinite idealization is im-
portant for the effect it has on a single ensemble (allowing non-analyticities, for
instance). In renormalization group theory, the infinite idealization is important
because it allows unlimited re-scaling as we move from ensemble to ensemble.
The apparent difference in the use of the idealization suggests the possibility
of significant philosophical distinctions. It will not do to blithely extend our
conclusions about statistical mechanics to cover renormalization group theory.
We distinguish two different types of explanation that utilize the renormal-
ization group framework. The first is an explanation of the critical behavior
of particular systems, and the second is the universal behavior of classes of
systems. The first type of explanation does not raise any fundamentally new
issues that we did not already consider in our discussion of the explanatory
reducibility of phase transitions in statistical mechanics. The second type of
explanation does raise significant new issues, since we move from the examina-
tion of phenomena in particular systems to phenomena characterizing classes of
systems. Batterman (2011) argues that the renormalization group explanation
of universality is a case of explanatory irreducibility. While we might be able
to tell a complex microphysical story that explains why a particular finite sys-
tem exhibits certain critical behavior (the first type of explanation), we cannot
account for the fact that many microscopically distinct systems exhibit identi-
cal critical behavior (the second type of explanation) without using the infinite
idealization.
We begin with a brief discussion the first type of explanation: the renor-
malization group applied to the critical behavior of individual systems. We
know from theory and experiment that there are large-scale correlations near
the critical point, and that mean field theory does not work in these conditions.
We need a method that can handle systems with long correlation lengths, and
this is exactly the purpose that the renormalization group method serves. We
idealize the correlation length of the system as infinite so that it flows to a fixed
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point under rescaling, and then calculate its critical exponent by examining the
behavior of the trajectory near the fixed point.
This raises the question of why a system with a large correlation length can
be successfully represented as a system with an infinite correlation length. If
we have no explanation of the success of this idealization, we have a case of
explanatory irreducibility. However, when we are focusing on the behavior of
a particular system, any irreducibility in the renormalization group theory is
inherited from orthodox statistical mechanics. The justification of the infinite
correlation length idealization will coincide with the justification for the infinite
system size idealization. Why does the renormalization group method need the
infinite limit? Because it relies on the divergence of the correlation length at
the critical point, which is impossible in a finite system. Why does the cor-
relation length diverge? Because it is related to the susceptibility, which is a
second derivative of the free energy and diverges. Why does the susceptibility di-
verge? Because there is a non-analyticity in the free energy. Explaining why (or
whether) this non-analyticity exists takes us back to the statistical mechanical
definition of phase transitions. If statistical mechanics can explain phase tran-
sitions reductively then the renormalization group does not pose an additional
philosophical problem when we focus on its application to particular systems.
It is true that the system must be idealized in order to employ renormaliza-
tion group theory, but that idealization can be justified outside renormalization
group theory.
The more interesting case is the second type of explanation, the explanation
of universality. Without the renormalization group method, we might examine
the behavior of individual finite system and discover that a number of such
systems, though microscopically distinct, exhibit strikingly similar macroscopic
behavior near criticality. However, this would not tell us why we should expect
this macroscopic similarity, and so it is not really a satisfactory explanation
of universality. The renormalization group method gives us a genuine expla-
nation: when the correlation length diverges, there is no characteristic length
scale. If the relevant parameters for the system vanish, as they do at criticality,
the system will flow to a fixed point under repeated re-scaling. Fixed points
can function as attractors, leading to similar critical behavior for a number of
different systems.
If the system size is finite, the system will not flow to a fixed point. We might
be able to show that a number of distinct large finite systems flow to points in
system space that are very close to each other, but once again all that we
have done is revealed the universality of critical (or near-critical) behavior. We
haven’t explained it. There is a generic reason to expect distinct infinite systems
to flow to stable fixed points, but without mentioning fixed points there does
not seem to be a generic reason to expect distinct finite systems to flow to points
that are near each other. So it seems that fixed points play an indispensable
role in the explanation of universal behavior. We can’t “de-idealize” and remove
reference to fixed points in the explanation, the way we can for non-analyticities
in particular systems. Think back to Butterfield’s example described in section
3.2. In that example, the apparent explanatory irreducibility of the behavior
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of f∞ was resisted by re-phrasing our explanations in terms of g∞, a function
whose behavior in the limit isn’t novel. In the case of the renormalization group,
it seems that this move is unavailable to us. Fixed points are a novel feature
that only appear in the infinite limit. There does not seem to be a clear sense in
which the renormalization flow of finite systems can approximate a fixed point.
A point is either a fixed point for the flow or it isn’t; it can’t be “almost” a fixed
point. And unlike Butterfield’s example, there does not seem to be a way of
re-phrasing the explanation of universality in terms that are approximated by
large finite systems.
So there is a strong prima facie case that universality is explanatorily irre-
ducible. However, we do not believe that the case stands up to scrutiny. To see
how it fails, we begin by showing that we can explain why finite systems exhibit
universal behavior near criticality. However, this explanation does require the
full resources of the renormalization group method, including fixed points. So
it is not an explanation of the sort that we were contemplating above, one that
does away with reference to fixed points. We will argue that this should not
actually trouble the reductionist, but first we present the explanation.
Consider an Ising system extending over a finite length. When the system
is rescaled, the separation between the nodes on the lattice increases. Since we
are keeping the system size fixed, this means the number of nodes will decrease.
So unlike the infinite system case, for a finite system the number of nodes is a
parameter that is affected by rescaling. If the number of nodes is N , we can
now think of 1/N as a relevant parameter (as defined in section 1.3). When
we restrict ourselves to the infinite case, we are considering a particular hyper-
surface of this new parameter space where 1/N is set to 0. However, since
1/N is a relevant parameter, perturbing the system off this hyper-surface (i.e.
switching from the infinite to a finite system) will take the system away from
the critical fixed point. This should be cause for concern. It seems there is
no hope for an explanatory reduction. If even a slight perturbation off the
1/N = 0 hyper-surface changes the critical behavior, how can we think of finite
systems as approximating the behavior of infinite systems? As Kadanoff says,
“if the block transformation ever reaches out and sees no more couplings in
the usual approximation schemes. . . that will signal the system that a weak
coupling situation has been encountered and will cascade back to produce a
weak coupling phase [a trivial fixed point with K = 0].” (Kadanoff, 2010b, p.
47)
However, all is not lost. The difference between the behavior of finite and
infinite systems depends on the correlation length. When the correlation length
is very small relative to the system size, the finite system behaves much like
the infinite system. The values of thermodynamic observables will not differ
substantially from their values for an infinite system. The behavior of the finite
system will only exhibit a qualitative distinction when the correlation length
becomes comparable to the system size. This phenomenon is known as finite
size cross-over (see Cardy (1996, ch. 4) for a full mathematical treatment). It
is a manifestation of the fact that the behavior of the system is sensitive to
the large-scale geometry of the system only when the correlation length is large
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enough to be comparable to the system size. The cross-over is controlled by
the reduced temperature. As long as this parameter is above a certain value
(given by an inverse power of the system size), the correlation length will be
small enough that no distinction between finite and infinite systems will be
measurable. It is only below the cross-over temperature that finite-size effects
become significant and the system flows away from the critical point. For a
large system, the cross-over temperature will be very small, and its difference
from the critical temperature t = 0 may be within experimental error. So for
a sufficiently large system, it is plausible that the infinite size approximation
will work all the way to criticality. Renormalization group theory itself predicts
this. A similar point is made in Butterfield (2011).
Cross-over theory also provides tools for estimating the changes to critical
behavior that come from changing the geometry of the system by limiting its
size. Adding system size as a parameter gives us a new scaling function for the
susceptibility, a description of how the susceptibility changes with changes in
relevant parameters. As described above, this scaling function gives a behavior
for the susceptibility similar to the infinite limit as long as the ratio of corre-
lation length to system size is low. It also allows us to predict the behavior of
the susceptibility when this ratio becomes close to one. The susceptibility of a
finite system will not diverge; it will have a smooth peak. The height of the
peak of susceptibility scales as a positive power of size of the system. So for a
large system, the susceptibility will be large but not infinite. In addition, the
location of the peak shifts, and this shift scales as an inverse power of the size.
This means that for a large system the difference between the critical tempera-
ture (the temperature at the critical fixed point of the infinite system) and the
temperature at which it attains maximum susceptibility is very small. So for a
macroscopic system, cross-over theory explains why it is a good approximation
to treat the susceptibility as diverging at the critical point.
The point of this discussion is that we can tell an explanatory story about
the circumstances under which particular large finite systems can be treated like
infinite systems. If the cross-over temperature is sufficiently small, then limita-
tions of our measurement procedures might make it difficult or even impossible
to distinguish that the system does not flow to the critical point. However, this
explanatory story does make reference to fixed points in system space. So the
worry is that it is not a fully reductive account. We may have explained why
individual finite systems can be successfully idealized as flowing to the critical
fixed point, but have we accounted for the existence of the critical fixed point?
We are taking for granted in our explanation the topological structure of sys-
tem space, a topological structure that is to a large extent determined by the
behavior of infinite systems.10
This is true, but does it lead to explanatory irreducibility? Is it illicit to in-
clude the topological structure of system space among the explanatory resources
of our lower level theory? It would be if this structure involved an idealization
whose efficacy could not be accounted for within the lower level theory. Isn’t an
10Our thanks to Robert Batterman for pushing us on this point.
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irreducible infinite idealization involved in the postulation of a renormalization
flow with fixed points? It is not. As we have seen, the renormalization flow can
be defined for all systems, finite and infinite alike, since 1/N can be introduced
as a relevant parameter. Fixed points will appear on the hyper-surface where
1/N = 0. There is no infinite idealization involved here. Of course, we are talk-
ing about infinite systems and how they behave under the renormalization flow,
but this should not be problematic from a reductive point of view. The problem
would arise if we model finite systems as infinite systems without explanation.
But at this stage, when we are setting up the space and determining its topolog-
ical characteristics, we are not modeling particular systems. In so far as finite
systems are represented in our description of the space, they are represented as
finite systems, and infinite systems are represented as infinite systems.
So the topological structure of the space can be described without problem-
atic infinite idealization. When we try to explain the universality of critical
behavior in finite systems, we do have to employ the infinite idealization, but
as we have seen, this idealization is not irreducible if we can use the topological
structure of system space in our reductive explanation. We can de-idealize for
particular systems, and see why they can be treated as if they flow to the critical
point. Understanding the behavior of infinite systems is crucial to explaining
the behavior of finite systems, since we only get the fixed points by examining
the behavior of infinite systems, but this in itself does not imply emergence.
We agree with Batterman (2011) that mathematical singularities in the renor-
malization group method are information sources, not information sinks. We
disagree with his contention that the renormalization group explanation requires
the infinite idealization, and is thus emergent. It requires consideration of the
behavior of infinite systems, but it does not require us to idealize any finite
system as an infinite system. Any actual infinite idealizations in a renormal-
ization group explanation can be de-idealized using finite-size cross-over theory.
Locating fixed points does not require an infinite idealization, it just requires
that our microscopic theory can talk about infinite systems, and indeed it can.
5 Conclusion
Phase transitions are an important instance of putatively emergent behavior.
Unlike many things claimed emergent by philosophers (e.g., tables and chairs),
the alleged emergence of phase transitions stems from both philosophical and
scientific arguments. Here we have focused on the case for emergence built from
physics. We have found that when one clarifies concepts and digs into the de-
tails, with respect to standard textbook statistical mechanics, phase transitions
are best thought of as conceptually novel, but not ontologically or explanato-
rily irreducible. And if one goes past textbook statistical mechanics, then an
argument can be made that they’re not even conceptually novel. In the case of
renormalization group theory, consideration of infinite systems and their singu-
lar behavior provides a central theoretical tool, but this is compatible with an
explanatory reduction. Phase transitions may be “emergent” in some sense of
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this protean term, but not in a sense that is incompatible with the reductionist
project broadly construed.∗
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